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IS BIGGEST BEST? 
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE FINANCIAL VIABILITY OF THE BRISBANE 
CITY COUNCIL 
 
Abstract 
Structural reform through forced mergers has been a dominant feature of Australian local 
government for decades. Advocates of compulsory consolidation contend that larger 
municipalities perform better across a wide range of attributes, including financial 
sustainability. While empirical scholars of local government have invested considerable effort 
into investigating these claims, no-one has yet examined the performance of Brisbane City 
Council against other local authorities, despite the fact that it is by far the largest council in 
Australia. This paper seeks to remedy this neglect by comparing Brisbane with Sydney City 
Council, an average of six south east Queensland councils and an average of ten metropolitan 
New South Wales councils against four measures of financial performance over the period 2008 
to 2011. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Across the world, local government has undergone a period of arduous reform over the past few 
decades and Australian local government has been no exception (Denters and Rose, 2005; Faulk 
and Hicks, 2011). While several policy instruments have been employed by Australian local 
government policy makers (Dollery, Kortt and Grant, 2013), in common with many other 
countries (see, for instance, Public Finance and Management, Special Editions 13(1) and 13(2), 
2013), structural reform through compulsory council consolidation has been the main engine of 
reform in the majority of Australian state and territory local government systems. As a 
consequence, the total number of local authorities in Australia decreased from 1067 to 680 (36 
per cent) from 1910 to 2008, although total population grew from 4,425,083 to 20,209,993 
people (an almost a five-fold increase) over the same period (Grant, Dollery and Crase, 2009). 
 
Proponents of municipal mergers typically contend that ‘bigger is better’ in local government or 
advance one or more aligned sub-claims on the relationship council size and council 
performance, such as ‘bigger is cheaper’, ‘bigger means improved services’, ‘bigger is more 
efficient’, and more recently ‘bigger is more financially viable’ (Sancton, 2011). Policy makers 
who pursue structural reform through council amalgamation programs frequently claim that 
larger local governmental entities will produce cost savings, boost productivity, improve the 
quantum and composition of local service provision, enhance administrative and technical 
capacity, improve strategic management, enable more effective lobbying with higher levels of 
government, and increase financial sustainability (Dollery and Robotti, 2008). 
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These claims are controversial and have engendered a long-standing debate in the scholarly 
literature (see, for example, Boyne, 1998; Oakerson, 1999; Bish, 2000; Dollery, Kortt and Grant, 
2013). Despite the ubiquity of compulsory council consolidation as an instrument of reform in 
the real-world, and a host of extravagant claims regarding its efficacy, the empirical literature is 
far from settled (see, for instance, Lago-Penas and Martinez-Vazquez, 2013). In the Australian 
context, debate continues apace, often centred on proposed amalgamation programs 
recommended by public inquiries (see Dollery, Grant and Kortt, 2012 for a detailed account of 
the relevant literature), such as the reform process propagated by the Independent Local 
Government Review Panel in New South Wales (NSW) in its final report Revitalising Local 
Government (2013) and the disputation surrounding the recommended municipal mergers in 
Perth by the Metropolitan Local Government Review (2012) in its Final Report. 
 
However, a surprising gap exists in the existing Australian empirical literature on the relationship 
between council size (as proxied by population) and council performance (as measured by 
performance indicators): no empirical study has yet evaluated the performance of the Brisbane 
City Council (BCC) – by far the largest local authority in Australia with an aggregate population 
of 1,079,392 persons (or around 380,800 households) as at 30 June 2011 – relative to other large 
Australian municipalities. An analysis of this kind could take advantage of the ‘natural 
experiment’ provided by the comparatively enormous size of the BCC. This paper seeks to 
address this omission in the empirical literature on Australian local government by examining 
the performance of the BCC relative to six large metropolitan councils in south east Queensland 
and eleven metropolitan councils in NSW. 
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The paper is divided into five main parts. Section 2 seeks to provide a synoptic account of the 
Australian debate over local government amalgamation by way of institutional background. 
Section 3 provides a brief summary of the empirical literature on council consolidation. Section 
4 sets out the data sources and empirical strategy employed in this paper. Section 5 discusses the 
results flowing from the empirical analysis. The paper ends with some brief concluding remarks 
on the policy implications of the analysis in section 6. 
 
2. THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT AMALGAMATION DEBATE 
In a quest to improve the operational efficiency of local government systems across the 
developed world, higher tiers of government have traditionally relied on structural reform 
through the compulsory consolidation of smaller councils into larger organisational units (e.g., 
Dollery, Grant and Kortt, 2012). This policy instrument has been repeatedly employed by policy 
makers in Australia, Britain and New Zealand, as well as across many European nations to 
significantly reduce the total number of local government authorities (e.g., Dollery, Crase and 
Johnson, 2006). 
 
In the Australian local government landscape, it is typically argued – usually without reference 
to the empirical literature – that forced amalgamations will result in substantial cost-savings and 
improved service delivery without adversely affecting a community’s ‘local voice’ (e.g., Dollery, 
Crase and Johnson, 2006; Dollery, Grant and Kortt, 2012). On the other hand, opponents of 
forced amalgamation give emphasis to the dearth of empirical evidence in support of compulsory 
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consolidation, the divisive impact of forced amalgamations on local communities, and the 
erosion of local democracy. 
 
Whilst the policy rationale for forced amalgamation is derived from the belief that larger 
councils are more efficient than smaller councils (e.g., Dollery, Crase and Johnson, 2006), it 
needs to be borne in mind that the theoretical and empirical literature on purported benefits of 
local government amalgamation is decidedly uncertain (Byrnes and Dollery, 2002; Dollery, 
Grant and Kortt, 2012). Notwithstanding the dearth of empirical evidence, the belief that ‘bigger 
is better’ is so entrenched in the psyche of local government policy makers that forced 
amalgamation has been repeatedly used in Australia and abroad in an attempt to enhance local 
government efficiency (Dollery, Byrnes and Crase, 2008; Dollery, Grant and Kortt, 2012). The 
notable exception is Western Australia, which is currently in the process of reducing the number 
of metropolitan councils in Perth from 30 to 12 (Drew and Dollery, 2014). 
 
3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF AMALGAMATION 
The empirical analysis of council amalgamations has attracted considerable interest from 
scholars across the world. To begin with, a sizable volume of empirical work exists on municipal 
mergers in the United States (e.g., Feiock 2004; Leland and Thurmaier, 2006; 2010; Faulk and 
Hicks, 2011; and Faulk and Grassmueck, 2012) and Canada (e.g., Reese, 2004, Vojnovic, 2000). 
The interest in council amalgamations is also evident among European scholars who have 
studied this issue for France, Germany, Italy and Spain (Dollery and Robotti, 2008) as well as 
Eastern Europe (Swianiewicz, 2010), Denmark (Vrangbæk, 2010), Greece (Hlepas, 2010), 
Macedonia (Kreci and Ymeri, 2010), Beligum and the Netherlands (DeCeuninck et al., 2010). 
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More recently, contributors to a two-part Special Edition of Public Finance and Management 
(2013) have also examined the impact of local government amalgamations for Australia and 
New Zealand, England and Wales, Estonia, Finland, and the United States. 
 
In general, the majority of this empirical literature casts considerable doubt on whether the 
purported benefits of council mergers were realised; particularly in relation to enhancing the 
operational efficiency of local councils. More specifically, a recurring theme found in the 
empirical literature is that the supposed benefits of local government amalgamation – specifically 
improvements in efficiency and cost-savings – have not been realised. For example, in an 
evaluation of the empirical work on whether amalgamation produced greater efficiency in the 
United States, Feiock (2004) concluded that municipal mergers had not met their proposed 
economic objectives, but had instead led to increased expenditure. More recently, Martin and 
Schiff (2011) found limited evidence that local government amalgamations enhanced council 
performance in terms of either improved service delivery or a corresponding decrease in costs. 
These empirical findings have also been mirrored in the Canadian literature. For example, in the 
analysis of municipal mergers in Ottawa, Reese (2004) noted that remuneration levels increased 
in the post-amalgamation period, resulting in a net increase in local government expenditure. 
Along similar lines, Vojnovic (2000) investigated the short-term effects among five Canadian 
councils and found that overall costs increased in three out of five local municipalities. 
 
In Europe, contributors to Dollery and Robotti (2008) examined municipal mergers in France, 
Germany, Italy and Spain and arrived at the same conclusion: that municipal mergers had failed 
to deliver on its intended objectives. Furthermore, in the Special Edition of Local Government 
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Studies, similar conclusions regarding the purported benefits of council amalgamation have been 
drawn for Eastern Europe (Swianiewicz, 2010), Denmark (Vrangbæk, 2010) and Germany 
(Wollmann, 2010). Hlepas (2010) was especially critical of the Greek program of municipal 
mergers while Kreci and Ymeri (2010) drew similar conclusions from the Macedonian program 
of council consolidations. Finally, DeCeuninck et al (2010) also concluded that the program of 
local government reform in Belgium and the Netherlands has also failed to realise its intended 
objectives. 
 
In Australia, the bulk of empirical evidence on the purported benefits of municipal mergers has 
been almost exclusively derived from a spate of official national and state-based public inquiries 
into the on-going financial viability of local government sector (see Dollery, Grant and Kortt, 
2012 for a review of these official public inquires). A common theme that has emerged from 
these official public inquiries is that the continued use of forced amalgamation as the preferred 
policy instrument has failed to address the seemingly intractable financial problems facing local 
councils across Australia (in particular rural and remote councils). In addition to these public 
inquiries, there is also a growing body of recent Australian empirical work that has raised 
considerable doubts as to whether the programs of forced council amalgamations in New South 
Wales (Drew, Kortt and Dollery, 2012), Queensland (Drew, Kortt and Dollery, 2014), Western 
Australia (Drew and Dollery, 2014) and Tasmania (Drew, Kortt and Dollery, 2013) would either 
improve local government performance or result in any cost-savings. 
 
However, as we have noted earlier, the Australian empirical literature on the relationship 
between council size (as proxied by population size) and council performance (as measured by a 
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range of financial performance indicators) is characterised by a curious omission: to date no 
empirical study has yet assessed the financial performance of the BCC relative to other large 
municipalities. An investigation of the comparative performance of the BCC would take 
advantage of the ‘natural experiment’ offered by the comparatively enormous size of the BCC 
relative to Sydney City Council, six large metropolitan councils in south east Queensland and 
eleven metropolitan councils in NSW. 
 
4. DATA AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
The data used in this study were sourced from the comparative financial information published 
by the Queensland Department of Local Government (QDLG, 2011) and the NSW Division of 
Local Government (NSWDLG, 2011) over the period 2008 to 2011. These data were then used 
to construct a database of four key performance indicators (KPIs) that were used to compare 
BCC to: 
 
(i) Sydney City Council (SCC); 
(ii) The average of six south east Queensland councils (i.e., Gold Coast, Ipswich City, 
Logan City, Moreton Bay, Redland City, and Sunshine Coast); and 
(iii) The average of ten metropolitan NSW councils (i.e., Campbelltown City Council, 
Gosford City Council, Hills Shire Council, Shire of Hornsby Council, Lake 
Macquarie City Council, Liverpool City Council, Newcastle City Council, Penrith 
City Council, Wollongong City Council and Wyong Shire Council). 
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The selection of comparison council groups was based on the widely used and accepted 
Australian Classification of Local Government (ACLG) schema (see, for instance, DITRDLG, 
2013). Table 1 provides summary statistics for the BCC, the Sydney City Council, the six south 
east Queensland councils, and the ten metropolitan NSW councils for 2011. Looking across 
Table 1 a number of points are worth noting. In the first place, the ACLG for BCC and Sydney 
City Council (SCC) is ‘Urban Capital City’ (UCC).1 While differences exist between BCC and 
SCC in terms of population size, population density and geographical area they do, however, 
share a similar ‘city profile’ with respect to the level of median income, the unemployment rate, 
and the amount received in terms of general purpose grant per capita. 
 
Secondly, the six south east Queensland (SEQ) councils were selected according to their 
geographical proximity to BCC and whether they met the ACLG criteria of either being 
classified as: (i) ‘Urban Fringe Very Large’ (UFV) (Ipswich City, Logan City, Moreton Bay, 
Redland City, and Sunshine Coast) or (ii) ‘Urban Rural Very Large’ (URV) (Gold Coast). The 
UFV and URV criteria were chosen because that they were the ‘closest match’ to the UCC 
criteria under the current ACLG schema (DITRDLG, 2013). Along similar lines, the ten NSW 
comparison councils were also selected using the UFV criteria, which, in effect, provides a 
quasi-control group for our set of SEQ councils. 
 
The selection of the KPIs used to measure financial sustainability – defined as a municipality’s 
long-term ability to generate adequate funds to provide the level of infrastructure and services as 
                                                            
1 BCC and SCC are the only municipalities in Queensland and New South Wales that are classified as ‘Urban 
Capital City’. 
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agreed with the local community – was obtained from the NSW Treasury Corporation’s 
Financial Sustainability of the New South Wales Local Government Sector (TCorp, 2013), 
which, in turn, was originally employed by the Queensland Treasury Corporation to assess the 
financial sustainability of Queensland local government (QTC, 2008). The principal advantage 
of using these KPIs is that it: (i) follows the customary practice for assessing the financial 
sustainability of local municipalities (including accepted benchmarks); and (ii) it readily permits 
a comparison of our results with those from other studies. 
 
The following KPIs were used to measure and compare the financial sustainability of the BCC 
(Table 2) in terms of its: 
 
(i) Financial flexibility which measures the municipality’s operating performance in 
terms of its own-source revenue capacity and control over operational expenditure; 
(ii) Liquidity which assesses a municipality’s efficiency in managing capital (i.e., the 
efficiency with which a municipality uses its most liquid assets, such as cash, to 
generate income without running the risk of ‘falling short’ on servicing its short-term 
liabilities); 
(iii) Debt service capacity which measures the municipality’s likelihood of defaulting on 
its debt obligation; and 
(iv) Asset management which demonstrates how efficiently a municipality manages its 
assets (i.e., its building and infrastructure assets). 
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Our empirical strategy was divided into three main parts. In the first place, we examined the 
short-term trend in the KPIs for BCC and each comparator group over a four year period (i.e., 
2008 to 2011) on which full information on all relevant data items was available. This period 
was selected to ensure that our analysis of BCC and the SEQ councils was based on the most 
recently available data following the 2008 Queensland amalgamations. Secondly, we examined 
how many times the established KPI benchmark criteria – as defined in Table 2 – were met for 
BCC and each comparison group over the same four year period. Finally, we estimated a short-
term forecast for BCC and each comparison group by applying the compound annual growth rate 
to the KPI in 2011. 
 
5. RESULTS 
The main results for the BCC and its comparison groups are reported in Table 3. More 
specifically, Table 3 shows: (i) the KPIs for 2011; (ii) the compound annual growth rate (CAGR) 
based on the last four years; (iii) the ‘on target’ percentage of meeting the benchmark within the 
past four years; and (iv) a short-term forecast determined by assuming that the KPI is 
growing/contracting at the same rate as it has in the previous four years. In turn, we now 
consider the financial flexibility, liquidity, debt service capacity, and asset management capacity 
for BCC and each comparison group. 
 
5.1 Financial flexibility 
The own-source operating revenue ratio – the proportion of own-source income to total operating 
income – was used to measure and compare the financial flexibility of the BCC to each 
comparison group. With respect to financial flexibility a number of points are worth noting. In 
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the first place, BCC’s own-source revenue has been well-below the accepted benchmark of 60% 
and its three comparison groups since 2010 (Figure 1). 
 
Secondly, BCC’s own-source operating revenue was 43% in 2011 and, based on current 
financial trends, its own-source operating revenue is expected to further deteriorate. While nearly 
all other comparison groups showed signs of worsening financial flexibility, it is noteworthy that 
BCC suffered the highest decline in own-source operating revenue of -9.8% followed by the 
SEQ comparison group (-6.1%). In stark contrast, however, SCC’s own-source funding capacity 
has remained virtually unchanged between 2008 and 2011. 
 
In sum, BCC’s relatively low own-source operating revenue ratio (and recent downward trend) 
raises concerns over the council’s continued ability to generate sufficient funds from its 
operating activities. 
 
5.2 Liquidity 
The unrestricted current ratio – the ratio of current assets to current liabilities – was used to 
measure and compare the liquidity of the BCC. Liquidity ensures whether short-term obligations 
are met – i.e., whether cash is readily available to run operations smoothly and whether required 
investments are not delayed unnecessarily. This KPI may be considered to be a more meaningful 
measure of liquidity since it only considers short-term assets and short-term liabilities. 
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Looking at Table 3, it is worth noting that BCC suffers from severe liquidity constraints with an 
unrestricted current ratio of 0.73 in 2011, which suggests that BCC does not have sufficient 
resources to pay its debts over the next 12 months. Moreover, BCC has failed to meet the 
established unrestricted current ratio benchmark in each of the four years under consideration 
(Figure 2). This stands in stark contrast to all other comparison groups which comfortably meet 
the recognised benchmark over the equivalent four year period. 
 
While BCC’s unrestricted current ratio has been steadily growing over the four year period 
(admittedly from a low base), its current growth rate is still insufficient for it to meet the 
established benchmark in the short-term. In other words, it is projected the liquidity constraints 
for BCC will persist in the short-term and could affect its future ability to provide services and 
maintain infrastructure assets for its local community. This stands in stark contrast to all other 
comparisons groups which do not appear to suffer from liquidity constraints. 
 
5.3 Debt serving ability 
The debt service cover ratio (DSCR) was used to measure and compare the debt servicing ability 
of the BCC to its comparison groups. More specifically, the DSCR measures a municipality’s 
ability to meet its ‘interest and principal repayments obligations’ within its existing operating 
earnings. The first point worth noting is that we were unable to assess the debt servicing ability 
of Sydney City Council because this particular council has been operating with a surplus 
between 2008 and 2011. 
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In 2011, BCC’s debt service cover ratio was 3.38, which exceeded the established benchmark of 
2. This means that BCC can comfortably meet its borrowing costs from its operating income. 
With a compound annual growth rate of 29.3%, it is projected that BCC’s debt service ratio will 
increase in the short-run to 4.37. However, this finding needs to be interpreted with care since 
BCC has only met this benchmark once between 2008 and 2011. In contrast, all three 
comparison groups have met the established benchmark in all four years over the same period 
(Figure 3). 
 
5.4 Asset management 
The building and infrastructure renewal ratio was used to measure and compare BCC asset 
management. This ratio compares the expenditure of infrastructure assets relative to 
infrastructure depreciation. While actual maintenance is measured conservatively (by only 
including capital works), the building and infrastructure renewal ratio measures all capital 
expenditure related to building and infrastructure assets in relation to the annual depreciation on 
these assets. 
 
In 2011, BCC’s renewal ratio was 3.20 (Table 3). This means that BCC’s investment in new 
infrastructure outweighs its infrastructure deterioration by three to one. BCC has met the 
established benchmark twice over the four year period (Figure 4). Moreover, BCC and the SEQ 
comparison group show a continuous increase in asset management capability. For example, 
BCC’s asset renewal ratio has grown at a compound annual growth rate of 48.6% while the SEQ 
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group of council’s asset renewal rate grew at 17% per annum. At this rate, BCC’s and SEQ’s 
asset renewals are expected grow to 4.76 and 3.47 in the short-term, respectively. 
 
BCC’s asset management performance in the past shows that it is in a position to provide 
adequate levels of infrastructure to its community and to continuously increase its ability to 
commit the required resources to support and maintain its infrastructure. However, an opposite 
trend is observed for the NSW comparison groups. This suggests that the NSW comparison 
groups’ ability to commit resources to infrastructure renewal has been continuously declining 
over the past four years. SCC and NSW councils are well below the benchmark in 2011 showing 
that infrastructure assets are deteriorating at a faster rate than councils’ ability to replace them 
(Figure 4). 
 
This result, however, needs to be interpreted with some degree of caution, since asset renewal 
measures are defined more narrowly for NSW councils and thus provide a more conservative 
measure of asset management efficiency. Notwithstanding this caveat, BCC has performed 
relatively well on this KPI in the last two years. 
 
In sum, our financial analysis of BCC casts considerable doubts over the continuing mantra that 
‘bigger is better’ in the context of contemporary Australian local government. Employing 
standard measures of financial sustainability, we found that between 2008 and 2011 the three 
comparison groups consistently ‘outperformed’ the BCC in the key areas of financial flexibility, 
liquidity and debt serving ability. Moreover, these findings lend further support to the growing 
corpus of research that suggests that ‘bigger is not always best’. 
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6. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Despite the fact that Australian local government policy making has relied heavily on structural 
reform through forced mergers as its chief policy instrument for decades, to date no-one has yet 
examined the relative performance of BCC compared with other like local authorities. This is 
surprising in several respects. In the first place, as we have seen, since BCC is by far the largest 
local government entity in Australia (as measured by absolute population size and by the number 
of households), if the claims of proponents of the ‘bigger is best’ doctrine underlying 
compulsory council consolidation are correct, then BCC should easily outperform comparator 
councils across a majority of performance indicators. In addition, the ‘natural experiment’ 
afforded by the dominant size of BCC relative to other analogous councils represents a most 
fortuitous opportunity for empirical researchers to determine whether ‘biggest is best’. 
 
This paper has sought to fill this gap in the empirical literature on Australian local government 
performance, at least in terms of financial performance. The empirical results obtained in this 
paper from our comparative financial analysis of BCC with three comparator groupings of 
councils provides cold comfort to advocates of the ‘bigger is better’ creed. Indeed, we find that 
the BCC is outperformed in three of the four financial performance indicators invoked in our 
analysis (financial flexibility, liquidity and debt serving ability) by all three comparator groups 
over the four years 2008 to 2011. 
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While our study is not only limited in the sense that it deals solely with financial performance, it 
is also restricted to four specific performance indicators from a potentially large pool of 
alternative fiscal measures of performance, and it should thus be accompanied by further 
empirical work on other non-financial aspects of municipal performance, it nonetheless provides 
food for thought for local government policy makers in all seven Australian state and territory 
jurisdictions with local government systems. If additional empirical work on other non-financial 
measures of performance comparing BCC to comparator councils corroborates the findings in 
this paper, then this will represent a further blow to the credibility of the ‘bigger is better’ 
ideology still dominating much Australian local government policy making.  
 
Our study is limited by the fact that it was conducted at the aggregate level and, as such, masks 
the inherent variability in the mix and quality of services delivered by different councils. Thus, 
further insights into the performance between the BCC and other councils could be gleaned by a 
comparative analysis of council-specific services that account for a large proportion of the 
council budget (e.g., local road investment and maintenance). Finally, one potential avenue for 
future research would be to identify and remove any impact the Queensland floods may have had 
on local government financial performance as it is possible that these natural disasters may, in 
part, explain the observed differences in the infrastructure asset renewal ratios for SEQ and NSW 
councils. We view this as an important area of future research. 
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 Table 1: Summary statistics on BCC, SCC, NSW and SEQ councils 
        Demographic Economic Financial 
Council ACLG 
Area 
(km2) 
Total 
road 
length 
(km) Density 
No. of 
house-
holds 
(’000) 
Median 
income 
($/year) 
Un-
employment 
rate (%) 
Rates and 
fees rev. per 
household 
($’000/year) 
Operating 
expenses 
per 
household 
($’000/year) 
GP grant 
per 
capita 
($/pers.) 
Local 
Roads 
grant ($ 
per km) 
Brisbane City UCC 1367.0 5,560 761.8 380.8 80,444 5.3 1,980.6 3,823.2 19.60 2379.70 
Gold Coast URV 1358.0 3,284 364.1 181.6 61,048 7.4 2,335.6 11,793.1 19.60 2055.95 
Ipswich City UFV 1089.0 1,465 153.3 56.3 64,116 7.2 2,180.2 2,772.2 22.36 1596.36 
Logan City UFV 913.0 2,115 304.5 91.3 65,676 7.1 1,618.4 1,987.1 21.44 1800.02 
Moreton Bay  UFV 2011.0 3,297 188.0 132.6 65,416 6.2 1,490.9 2,088.9 20.74 1613.67 
Redland City UFV 537.0 1,026 258.2 49.2 70,980 5.4 1,918.9 2,839.4 21.10 1858.81 
Sunshine Coast UFV 3126.0 3,671 98.2 116.7 52,520 7.1 2,121.4 2,794.1 20.92 1369.30 
SE QLD average (excluding 
Brisbane City)   1505.7 2,476 227.7 104.6 63293 6.7 1,944.2 4,045.8 21.03 1715.69 
Sydney City UCC 26.7 301 6,348.5 73.2 85,228 5.8 4,619.2 5,341.0 25.46 3553.87 
Campbelltown City Council UFV 312.1 633 467.7 47.3 65,052 7.4 1,763.1 2,632.3 54.42 2321.44 
Gosford City Council UFV 939.9 947 172.8 61.3 56,628 6.1 2,911.6 3,696.5 40.65 2020.91 
Hills Shire Council UFV 401.0 832 423.6 53.3 106,288 4.2 1,739.6 2,074.2 19.49 2069.81 
Shire of Hornsby Council UFV 462.0 620 339.5 52.7 94,848 4.8 1,620.0 2,208.7 19.49 2232.56 
Lake Macquarie City 
Council URV 648.0 1,254 291.7 70.6 58,084 5.3 1,640.4 2,408.9 64.03 1931.50 
Liverpool City Council UFV 306.0 766 588.7 53.6 67,548 7.0 1,827.3 2,716.9 32.67 2259.10 
Newcastle City Council URV 187.0 746 794.3 58.5 60,580 5.7 2,714.8 3,899.3 70.84 2156.12 
Penrith City Council UFV 405.0 967 440.7 59.4 72,696 5.5 2,038.8 3,052.3 49.94 2045.39 
Wollongong City Council URV 684.0 885 281.3 71.8 57,252 7.0 2,312.9 3,043.2 65.15 2295.17 
Wyong Shire council UFV 740.0 1,016 202.4 55.9 48,568 7.8 3,088.7 4,001.0 57.63 1922.34 
NSW councils average 
(excluding Sydney City)   508.5 867 400.3 58.4 68754 6.1 2,165.7 2,973.3 47.43 2125.43 
NSW State 800,809 145,646 8.6 2471.3 64,324 5.9 2,538.0 3,742.9 64.97+ 1263.60+ 
QLD State 1,730,620 152,578 2.5 1547.3 64,220 6.1 2,545.5 4,867.1 65.34# 778.95# 
*Australian Classification of Local Governments (ACLG): UCC = Urban Capital City; UFV = Urban Fringe Very Large; URV = Urban Rural Very Large. 
+Average for UFV councils in NSW. 
#Average for URV councils in QLD. 
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Table 2: Definition of key performance indicators 
KPI Benchmark Calculation Definition 
    
Own source 
operating 
revenue ratio 
> 60%  
 
This ratio measures fiscal flexibility. It is the degree of reliance on 
external funding sources such as operating grants and contributions. A 
Council's financial flexibility improves the higher the level of its own 
source revenue. 
     
Unrestricted 
current ratio+ 
> 1.5 times 
 
 
Restrictions placed on various funding sources complicate the 
traditional current ratio used to assess liquidity of businesses as cash 
allocated to specific projects is restricted and cannot be used to meet a 
Council’s other operating and borrowing costs. The Unrestricted 
Current Ratio is specific to local government and is designed to 
represent a Council’s ability to meet short term obligations as they fall 
due. 
    
Debt service 
cover ratio 
(DSCR) 
> 2x 
 
This ratio measures the availability of operating cash to service debt 
including interest and lease payments (income statement) and 
principal repayments (cash flow statement). 
 
    
Building and 
infrastructure 
asset renewal 
ratio 
 
>1x 
 This ratio compares the proportion spent on infrastructure asset 
renewals and the asset’s deterioration 
measured by its accounting depreciation.  
+This definition applies for NSW councils. QLDs current ratio is measured as Total current assets (excluding unspent loan monies drawn down and water charges accrued but not yet levied) divided by 
Total liabilities. 
# Asset renewals measured as investment activity in building and infrastructure assets, since Queensland councils do not provide detailed information on investments in asset replacement versus asset 
upgrades. This definition deviates from the TCorp report, in which asset renewals only capture investment activity in the replacement or refurbishment of existing assets to an equivalent capacity or 
performance as opposed to the acquisition of new assets or the refurbishment of old assets that increase capacity or performance. 
  
ܴܽݐ݁ݏ , ݑݐ݈݅݅ݐ݅݁ݏ ܽ݊݀ ݄ܿܽݎ݃݁ݏ
ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ	݋݌݁ݎܽݐ݅݊݃ ݎ݁ݒ݁݊ݑ݁ ݈݅݊ܿ. ܿܽ݌݅ݐ݈ܽ ݃ݎܽ݊ݐݏ ܽ݊݀ ܿ݋݊ݐݎܾ݅ݑݐ݅݋݊ݏ
 
ܱ݌݁ݎܽݐ݅݊݃ ݎ݁ݏݑ݈ݐݏ ܾ݂݁݋ݎ݁ ݅݊ݐ݁ݎ݁ݏݐ ܽ݊݀ ݀݁݌ݎ݁ܿ݅ܽݐ݅݋݊ ሺܧܤܫܶܦܣሻ
ܲݎ݅݊ܿ݅݌݈ܽ ݎ݁݌ܽݕ݉݁݊ݐݏ ൅ ܾ݋ݎݎ݋ݓ݅݊݃ ݅݊ݐ݁ݎ݁ݏݐ ܿ݋ݏݐݏ
 
ܥݑݎݎ݁݊ݐ ܽݏݏ݁ݐݏ ݈݁ݏݏ ݈݈ܽ ݁ݔݐ݁ݎ݈݊ܽ ݎ݁ݏݐݎ݅ܿݐ݅݋݊ݏ
ܥݑݎݎ݁݊ݐ ݈ܾ݈݅ܽ݅݅ݐ݅݁ݏ ݈݁ݏݏ ݏ݌݂݁ܿ݅݅ܿ ݌ݑݎ݌݋ݏ݁ ݈ܾ݈݅ܽ݅݅ݐ݅݁ݏ
 
ܣݏݏ݁ݐ ݎ݁݊݁ݓ݈ܽݏ#
ܦ݁݌ݎ݁ܿ݅ܽݐ݅݋݊ ݋݂ ܾݑ݈݅݀݅݊݃ ܽ݊݀ ݂݅݊ݎܽݏݐݎݑܿݐݑݎ݁ ܽݏݏ݁ݐݏ
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Table 3: Key performance indicators for BCC, SCC, SEQ and NSW 
      
Brisbane 
City 
Sydney 
City# 
SEQ 
comparison 
group 
NSW 
comparison 
group 
O
w
n
 
s
o
u
r
c
e
 
o
p
e
r
a
t
i
n
g
 
r
a
t
i
o
 
(
>
6
0
%
)
 
Latest 43% 68% 58% 65% 
CAGR -9.8% -0.1% -6.1% -2.1% 
On target^ 50% 100% 75.0% 88% 
Forecast* 39% 68% 54% 64% 
U
n
r
e
s
t
r
i
c
t
e
d
.
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
r
a
t
i
o
 
(
>
1
.
5
x
)
 
Latest 0.73 4.3 3.81 2.70 
CAGR 30.7% 6.7% 23.9% 2.0% 
On target^ 0% 100% 88% 68% 
Forecast* 0.95 4.59 4.98 2.81 
D
e
b
t
 
s
e
r
v
i
c
e
 
c
o
v
e
r
 
r
a
t
i
o
 
(
>
2
x
)
 
Latest 3.38 -- 3.28 12.54 
CAGR 29.3% -- 1.3% 8.3 
On target^ 25% -- 67% 100% 
Forecast* 4.37 -- 4.34 15.88 
B
u
i
l
d
i
n
g
 
&
 
i
n
f
r
a
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
 
a
s
s
e
t
 
r
e
n
e
w
a
l
 
r
a
t
i
o
 
(
>
1
x
)
 
Latest 3.20 0.89 2.39 0.58 
CAGR 48.6% -52.1% 17.0% -44.9% 
On target^ 75% 75% 60% 53% 
Forecast* 4.76 0.43 3.47 0.34 
^On target measured as the number of years, in which the respective council met the benchmark, in the past 4 years expressed as percentage. 
*Short-term forecast is estimated on applying the compound annual growth rate (CAGR) to the latest KPI measure. 
#SCC had no debt from 2008-2011. 
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Figure 1: Own source operating revenue ratio       Figure 2: Unrestricted current ratio 
 
 
Figure 3: Debt service cover ratio       Figure 4: Building and infrastructure asset renewal ratio 
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